This paper specifies an empirical framework for estimating both technical and allocative efficiency, which is applied to a large panel of European banks over the years 1996 to 2003. Our methodology allows for self-consistent measurement of technical and allocative inefficiency, in an effort to address the issue known in the literature as the Greene problem. The results suggest that, on average, European banks exhibit constant returns to scale, that technical and allocative efficiency are close to 80% and 75% respectively, and that overall economic efficiency shows a clearly improving trend. We also show through the comparison of various estimators that models incorporating only technical efficiency tend to overestimate it.
Introduction
It has been established that banks, in their role as financial intermediaries, contribute significantly to economic activity in a number of ways. During the last two decades the banking sector has experienced major transformations worldwide in its operating environment. Both external and domestic factors have affected its structure, efficiency and performance. An efficient banking sector is better able to withstand negative shocks and contribute to the stability of the financial system. Therefore, the efficiency of banks has attracted the interest of international research.
Several studies have estimated bank efficiency using either parametric or nonparametric frontiers.
1 Yet, few studies have attempted to offer a cross-country comparison of the efficiency of the European banking system and none, to our knowledge, has jointly estimated its technical and allocative efficiency. Studies that estimate the efficiency of European banks, using standard techniques, include Pastor et al. (1997) , Dietsch and Weill (1998) , , Altunbas and Chakravarty (2001), Maudos et al. (2002) , Bikker (2002) and Casu and Molyneux (2003) .
Use of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to estimate bank efficiency presents well-known difficulties in incorporating a stochastic component in the statistical model. Similarly, the decomposition of overall cost efficiency into its technical 2 and allocative 3 components using flexible functional forms has proved to be problematic, since the implied production function cannot be derived. For this reason, researchers have been content to either ignore allocative inefficiency or impose ad hoc restrictions to integrate it in an empirical model.
The novel feature of the present paper is that it extends the existing literature by modeling both technical and allocative inefficiency of European banks within a stochastic frontier framework, using the implications of the relationship derived in 1 There are three main parametric frontier approaches to measuring efficiency, namely the stochastic frontier approach (SFA), the distribution free approach (DFA) and the thick frontier approach (TFA). Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is the most common among the non-parametric approaches, which also include the free disposal hull (FDH). For a thorough description of these approaches, see Berger and Humphrey (1997) . A limited number of studies use distance functions to measure efficiency (e.g. English et al.) . 2 Technical efficiency (TE) reflects the ability of a firm to obtain maximal output from a given set of inputs. 3 Allocative efficiency (AE) reflects the ability of a firm to use the inputs in optimal proportions, given their respective prices. The product of TE and AE is overall economic efficiency (EE). Kumbhakar (1997) . Unlike Kumbhakar and Tsionas (2005) who use a relatively complex Bayesian approach, we present an approximate solution that is relatively easy to implement since we provide a log-likelihood function for this model in closed form. We obtain technical and allocative inefficiency for individual banks at each point in time, by applying a cross sectional maximum likelihood estimation method to a panel of European banks, and then, for expositional brevity, present averages on a country-specific basis and for the European banking system as a whole.
The results suggest that, on average, European banks are characterized by constant returns to scale, although the conventional estimation methods tend to slightly underestimate the magnitude of scale efficiencies. Most importantly, models that include only technical inefficiency significantly overestimate it (strong evidence for this is found for countries like Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden). However, both technical and allocative efficiency (TE and AE, respectively) have shown a tendency to improve in recent years, as banks apply better managerial practices in order to enhance their overall performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief review of the literature, followed in Section 3 by the theoretical model. Section 4 deals with the estimation methodology. Section 5 discusses the data and the empirical results and, finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. Greene (1980) defined allocative inefficiency as the departure of the actual cost shares from the optimum shares, failing, in such a context, to derive the relationship between allocative inefficiency and cost increases from such inefficiency (Greene problem) . Since then, the literature has proposed an approximate relationship to model allocative inefficiency in the fashion of Schmidt (1984) who modeled the cost of allocative inefficiency as the product of the errors in the cost share equations and a specified positive semi-definite matrix. However, this approximate relationship is not free of problems, as it may lead to inconsistencies that bias the results by unknown magnitudes and in unknown directions. Kumbhakar (1997) , in an important contribution that followed the definition of allocative inefficiency in Schmidt and Lovell (1979) , used a translog cost function and established an exact relationship between allocative inefficiency in the cost share equations and in the cost function. Empirical estimation of this model has been restricted to panel datasets in which technical and allocative inefficiency are either assumed to be fixed parameters or functions of the data and unknown parameters (Maietta, 2002) . Application of such a model in banking has been limited to Kumbhakar and Tsionas (2005) . Their model reduces to a nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression with nonlinear random effects, which they estimate using panel data on U.S. commercial banks. They show that the inclusion of allocative inefficiency in the model produces some notable differences from simple models of technical efficiency, since failure of banks to efficiently allocate their inputs leads to further increases in costs.
Brief review of the literature
A number of studies offer a European cross-country comparison of bank efficiency, using standard efficiency estimation methods. 4 Pastor et al. (1997) 
Theoretical model
In this section we follow Kumbhakar (1997) Kumbhakar (1997) showed that the translog system (with a single output) can be written as follows. 
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Estimation
The system to be estimated is (Bauer, 1990 ). As we already mentioned, although Kumbhakar (1987) presented the model, he did not provide an estimation technique, while Kumbhakar and Tsionas (2005) presented a Bayesian approach, which rests on the introduction of additional error terms in the share equations. Here, we provide an approximate solution that can be easily implemented in practice, since we provide a log-likelihood function for this model in closed form.
More specifically, we consider a first order Taylor 
1,..., i n = .
It should be noted that , where
is precisely the matrix whose negative semi-definiteness implies concavity of the translog cost function (Diewert and Wales, 1987, p. 48) and it can be shown that its elements are the elasticities of substitution. It is also remarkable that a first order expansion makes the cost function independent of i A i ξ s, a fact that will be of considerable use in formulating the likelihood function of the model.
To proceed with estimation, we assume that
All the error terms are assumed to be i.i.d., mutually independent, and independent of the predetermined variables (prices, outputs etc). Under these assumptions it is clear that 1 (0,
The implication of modeling allocative inefficiency along the lines of Kumbhakar (1987) is that the error terms of the system, namely the i η s, are no longer i.i.d.; in particular they have to exhibit heteroscedasticity of a special form. Notice that heteroscedasticity here depends on β through the dependence of on the derived shares, .
We will estimate the model using the method of ML. The likelihood function is given by
where , ,
, and , ϕ Φ denote the standard normal density function and distribution function respectively.
The second part of this expression is the familiar likelihood function of a half-normal cost frontier.
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Taking logarithms and concentrating out Σ , we get the estimator
where ( ) ( )
7 See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, p. 76-77) . 8 In the derivation it is useful to notice that matrices A i and Σ are symmetric.
Relative to a cost-share system with technical inefficiency, the additional term reflects the heteroscedasticity in the share equation residuals that must be accounted for in estimation by ML. Since this term depends on 1 ln || ||
β it is not possible to obtain consistent estimators of β by estimating a cost-share system with homoscedastic error terms in the share equations. It is possible to get an estimator that accounts for the Jacobian term by assuming that shares are close to zero, in which case we obtain . This approximation makes the additional term independent of the particular observation so the log-likelihood function can be easily programmed in standard econometric software. In the case of three inputs, for example, this term is simply Given parameter estimates derived from ML, it is possible to obtain measures of bank-specific technical and allocative inefficiency. Bank-specific technical inefficiency can be obtained using ML estimation has proved difficult primarily because numerical derivatives are not accurate enough, at least in our application, and/or because obtaining the log of the normal cdf is dangerous for large negative values of the argument. For this reason we have used a Nelder-Mead simplex maximization technique which does not require derivatives. Derivatives are, however, needed to obtain the standard errors of the parameters. To obtain standard errors we have resorted to a Metropolis-Hastings Markov Chain Monte Carlo technique (Tierney, 1994) to draw a sample from the posterior distribution of the model and use the estimated standard errors of the parameter draws to gain an appreciation of the curvature of the log-likelihood around its mode. 9 We have used flat priors to obtain the posterior, which we call
and Y denotes the data.
The particular version of the Metropolis-Hastings scheme used is as follows.
Given the estimated covariance matrix V of a cost-share system with technical but no allocative inefficiency, we draw a proposal ( )
, where is a positive parameter. That means we consider this model a reasonable approximation to the model that has both technical and allocative inefficiency. With probability
The square roots of the diagonal elements of this matrix can be used as standard errors associated with the ML estimate of the model that we obtained via the Nelder-Mead procedure. Since the posterior means derived from the Bayesian approach are very close to the ML parameter estimates, we only report the latter.
Data and empirical results

Data
The proposed method is applied to a sample of European commercial banks for the period 1996 to 2003. We choose to limit the empirical analysis to the unconsolidated statements of commercial banks in order to reduce the possibility of introducing aggregation bias in the results. All necessary data is obtained from the BankScope database and includes 13 of the 15 EU countries.
10
The first problem encountered in bank efficiency studies is the definition and measurement of output. The two most widely used approaches are the 'production' 11 and the 'intermediation' 12 approaches. While we acknowledge that it would probably be best to employ both approaches to identify whether the results are biased when using a different set of outputs, sufficient data to perform such an analysis on European banks is generally unavailable. Hence, this study uses the 'intermediation approach' for two main reasons: First, this approach is inclusive of interest expenses that usually account for over one-half of total costs and second the BankScope database lacks the necessary data for implementation of the production approach.
Having defined the methodological approach to be followed, we focus our attention on the selection of variables. Table 1 reports the variables to be used, along with some descriptive statistics. We use a dual approach that captures both the input and output characteristics of deposits, in the sense that interest expenses include interest paid on deposits, while deposits are associated with a substantial amount of liquidity and payment services provided to depositors (see Berger and Humphrey, 1997) . We generate input prices by dividing all their respective costs by total assets, given that BankScope does not include comprehensive information on input quantities.
13
10 Greece and Finland are excluded from the analysis due to data limitations. 11 Under this approach output is measured by the number of transactions or documents processed over a given time period (see Berger and Humphrey, 1997) . 12 Under this approach output is measured in terms of values of stock variables (such as loans, deposits, etc.) appearing in bank accounts. 13 Clearly, it is possible that defining the price of inputs in terms of output could result in some bias against e.g. those banks, which hire high quality and, therefore, relatively high cost staff. This potential bias is mitigated, however, given that banks with higher quality staff should expect to see some benefit in terms of output. Hence, providing that the high quality staff is sufficiently productive, such banks will not be disadvantaged from a relative efficiency point of view. 
Empirical results
So far we have presented the model for technical efficiency with a single output. We rewrite it here for the three output-three input case 15 using the translog functional form: 
The assumptions about the noise components and the technical inefficiency component (u) are the same as before. The model incorporating allocative inefficiency is the above system of equations amplified with the system comprised of equations (9) and (10). The methodology described in Section 4 provides efficiency estimates for each cross sectional unit (bank) at each point in time. In other words, we are able to get efficiency estimates equal to the number of observations. Due to space 14 Berger (1995) suggests that relaxation of the perfect capital markets assumption allows an increase in capital to raise expected earnings, by reducing the expected costs of financial distress. Clearly, a wellcapitalized bank is better able to absorb unexpected credit losses and provide safety for depositors and creditors. On the other hand, too much capital reduces the bank's ability to maximize returns. 15 We impose homogeneity by dividing all inputs by physical capital (the third input).
considerations we calculate and present country as well as year averages, based on these estimates.
In Table 2 we report estimation results with five different methods: The first is a simple OLS regression on the translog cost function, the second is a SUR on the translog cost share system, the third is a SUR on the translog cost share system with technical efficiency (SUR T ) followed by a ML estimate obtained from Nelder-Mead simplex as described in Section 3, and finally estimation of approximate translog cost share system with both technical and allocative inefficiency (SUR T&A ).
A first comment regarding the results is that the capital ratio is negatively and significantly correlated with total cost. This implies that the perfect capital markets assumption may not hold. This result is consistent with most of the literature that examines such a relationship, including Berger (1995) and models of the so-called Structure-Conduct Performance hypothesis (SCP) (for a review of these models see Goddard et al., 2001 ).
We estimate scale economies 16 for all banks and report their temporal variation (by averaging the bank-specific values across years) and overall mean obtained from the four estimation methods (Table 3 [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] . 17 The results obtained from the different estimation methods present small differences among themselves. The model without allocative inefficiency seems to slightly underestimate overall scale economies. On average, there is a trend toward decreasing returns to scale in European banking (although the overall change is smaller than 1%). These findings are consistent with the belief that the European banking system has exploited whatever returns to scale were available and that recently the drive to improved performance has come from greater efficiency.
Some average efficiency measures are given in Table 4 and are illustrated in Comparison with previous studies in terms of efficiency scores cannot be made directly since we utilize data from 1997 onwards, the endpoint of the datasets in most of the recent literature. However, our findings regarding the most efficient banking sectors are similar to those in , Bikker (2002) and Casu and Molyneux (2003) , with the exception of Belgium whose banking system seems to operate at a significantly improved efficiency level. It also seems that at the beginning of our data period (1996) the average efficiency level of our dataset is higher than that of when we do not incorporate allocative efficiency, but lower when we do.
A clearer picture is obtained by the diagrammatic representation of the results discussed above. Fig. 1 Fig. 2 . The correlation between these rankings is fairly high, although there exist some outliers. Yet, if the focus is on individual bank efficiency, a choice between models cannot be made, given the high degree of correlation of efficiency rankings between the two models. Fig. 3 illustrates the kernel density function of the allocative efficiency estimates, showing that the range of the allocative efficiency scores is wider than those of technical efficiency. Therefore, there exists a broader array of firms that are allocative inefficient. One could then identify which set of inputs is the major source of this inefficiency by looking at the kernel density functions of the ξs and ηs. The density functions of allocative inefficiency parameters (price distortion ξ j ) are reported in Fig. 4 . These density functions, even though centered around zero (which means that banks on average do not seem to have significant relative price distortions), differ in terms of spread and overall shape. For loanable funds (input 1), relative price distortions (ξ 1 ) can be as large as 4% with a peak at around -1%, whereas for labor (input 2) the spread is much lower and the peak is very close to zero. This reflects the fact that for loanable funds banks seem to misperceive prices, while they seem to manage labor costs efficiently. Finally, the fact that the density function of ξ 1 is not particularly tight means that banks are quite heterogeneous in terms of allocative inefficiency. Finally, in Table 5 we report the average technical change across countries (again calculated as the average of the bank-specific estimates across countries), measured by the derivative of the estimated cost function with respect to the time trend. The main finding is that technical change positively contributed to the annual cost of banks, especially in Denmark, Ireland and Italy. However, we should treat these estimates with great caution, given the problems associated with the use of a time trend as a proxy for technical change (Hunter and Timme, 1991) .
Policy implications are straightforward. Banks should focus on reducing managerial and other inefficiencies rather than trying to exploit economies of scale in the rather competitive European banking framework, and estimates show that this has recently been their main policy objective. Apparently, deregulation, liberalization and ongoing financial integration have increased the need for better quality management and forced banks to operate more rationally. In this context, banks' policy objective should be twofold, although this tends to be overlooked by the literature. The first objective reflects their ability to maximize output from a given set of inputs (TE), while the second involves their ability to optimize the amount of inputs to be used, given prices (AE). Banks, on average, stand to gain an additional 18% improvement from output maximization and a 16% improvement from a better allocation of their inputs (see last row of Table 4b ). Yet, we should note that this study examined the efficiency of commercial banks only, which are on average characterized by higher inefficiencies.
Conclusions
The world of European banking is in a constant state of flux, as bankers, governments and the European Commission react to the pressures produced by new competition, new technology and growing globalization. As the level of sophistication 20 Luxembourg is a unique case, not easily comparable with other EU banking systems, mainly due to the fact that few of the banks operating in Luxembourg are active in the domestic market and other legal reasons. Cost efficiencies are achieved by offering a broad range of products or services to a very large customer base (which could originate e.g. from the large fixed costs incurred in gathering an information data base to be used for providing a large set of services).
in the operation of the banking sector improves, there is evidently less gain to be exploited from economies of scale, while there is still considerable room for improvement stemming from higher levels of efficiency.
We contend that overall economic efficiency of banks should be modeled along the proposition of Farrell (1957) , who decomposed it into its technical and allocative components. In the present paper, we exploited the relationship derived in Kumbhakar (1997) to overcome the problems associated with estimation of both technical and allocative inefficiency using flexible functional forms, known in the literature as the Greene problem. Next we described the empirical implementation of this model on a panel dataset of commercial banks of 13 EU countries.
The findings suggest that both the technical and allocative components significantly contribute to overall inefficiency, while exclusion of the latter from the model biases TE and, therefore, the overall efficiency level. The most technically efficient banking sectors were found to be those of Austria, Germany and the UK, the same sectors also recording the lower allocative inefficiency scores. In contrast, the banking sectors of Ireland, Portugal and Italy have much more to gain from improving their efficiency level. The high allocative inefficiency and its degree of differentiation in terms of the efficiency scores among the countries examined suggest that much is to be done regarding the optimization of banking inputs' usage and management.
Since the efficient use of individual inputs in banking is substantially underinvestigated, this is a desideratum for future research.
The task is to find the first derivatives of the cost function and share equations with respect to the ξ 's, and evaluate them at 
Number of observations: 3935
The figures have been deflated using country-specific CPI indices with 1995 as a base year.
To define the price of labor and the price of physical capital we use total assets instead of the number of employees and the value of fixed assets respectively, since the BankScope database does not include comprehensive information on these measures. 
